Private Equity Sports Deals Lean on Credit as Exits Stay Elusive

A summer of record checks

Private equity money is now part of the ownership of professional sports teams. The summer of 2026 made that hard to argue with. In August, Apollo Sports Capital agreed to put $2.6 billion of debt and equity into Yankee Global Enterprises, the holding company behind the New York Yankees. The Steinbrenner family keeps full control, and Apollo's sports chief, Al Tylis, gets a newly created board seat.32 Within days, KKR-owned Arctos agreed to buy 10% of the Atlanta Falcons at a reported $10.6 billion valuation. That would make the Falcons Arctos's fourth NFL team.12 Around the same time, a group led by Bob Iger and Josh Kushner, backed by Kushner's Thrive Eternal holding company, agreed to buy a majority of the Los Angeles Lakers at a record $12.5 billion.23

The trend is broad. As of May, the CFA Institute counted more than 74 North American pro teams with some private equity involvement.23 A later tally put the number of U.S. men's teams with private equity backing at 77, including a third of NBA franchises.41 Oaklins, an M&A advisory firm, says private equity-backed consolidators have accounted for 61% of all sports-industry deals since 2019.23

The obvious question is why buyout firms would want assets they cannot control and cannot easily sell. Looking across the coverage, the answer is that the buyout model is not really what is going on. Sports has become a home for patient, long-term capital and for structured credit. The industry's unsolved problem is not getting money in. It is getting money out.

The investment case: scarcity, media money and appreciation

The coverage broadly agrees on why investors want in. Media rights deals and steady fan engagement give teams predictable revenue, which appeals to firms looking for stable returns.23 The supply of top-tier teams is fixed, and analysts say that natural cap helps protect valuations.28 The price gains back that up. Sportico's latest figures put the average NFL franchise at $9.34 billion, up a record 31% in one year.42 Mark Walter bought the Lakers for about $10 billion and sold them for $12.5 billion less than a year later.26

Sports values also tend to hold up in downturns. An index built by Arctos and the University of Michigan reportedly showed franchise values falling less than 2% through both the dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis.11 Arthur Blank bought the Falcons for $545 million in 2002. The Arctos deal values that purchase at roughly 18 to 19 times what he paid.1117

Some commentators push back on this. One investor-focused analysis points out that the Falcons price was agreed privately between a willing institutional buyer and a seller under no pressure. Nobody knows what the team would fetch in a forced sale.11 That is a fair caution, because many of these numbers are private marks rather than prices set in an open market.

Owners need the money too

Demand is only half the story. As valuations have climbed beyond what even very rich individuals can easily pay, leagues have turned to institutional money to keep sales possible. When the NFL opened up in 2024, it cited exactly that problem: rising prices were making it harder for owners to buy in.15 Bank of America's Raul Anaya says leagues see private equity as a way to fund growth and stadiums and to let longtime family owners cash out.41

The Yankees deal shows how this works. Reports say $800 million buys an initial 8%, another $800 million comes in as new shares over four years, and Apollo adds a $1 billion loan, leaving it with roughly 16% of the equity.38 Sportico reported that the Steinbrenners and some limited partners are selling at least 4% of the parent company in the deal.35 For a family that has owned the club since 1973, that means cash and a stronger balance sheet without giving up control.31

The rules keep investors passive, and they are loosening

Every major U.S. league now allows funds to take minority stakes. Minority deals make up close to half of all sports transactions worldwide.22 The NFL, which held out longest, has the strictest rules. A fund can own at most 10% of a team and needs at least 3%. It can invest in no more than six teams, must hold for at least six years, and gets no vote.1116 When the rules were adopted, Commissioner Roger Goodell said they "won't change a thing" about who runs teams.16 Six NFL teams now have private equity investors. Besides Arctos's four, Sixth Street owns 3% of the Patriots and Ares owns 10% of the Dolphins.12

The caps are moving, though. The NBA raised the number of teams one fund can invest in from five to eight.23 MLB owners quietly raised their 15% limit per fund this summer, according to Forbes, bringing it closer to the NBA's 20%. That change is what made room for Apollo's 16% Yankees stake.38 Other outlets still cited the 15% cap when they covered the deal, so the rule change was not widely known at first.3335

Reported numbers also differ. Sportico said the Yankees deal values the parent company at more than $10 billion. Forbes and the New York Post put the figure above $12 billion, well above Forbes's own $8.5 billion estimate from earlier in the year.3538 Some of that gap may come from how each outlet treats the debt in the deal and the parent company's other holdings, which include the YES Network, Legends Hospitality and stakes in AC Milan and New York City FC.34

The exit problem

This is the weak spot. A typical buyout fund buys control, improves the business and sells within a few years. Minority team stakes allow none of that. Lawyers advising these funds say there is no built-in way to exit. Majority owners usually demand the first right to buy, which discourages outside bidders, and no formal secondary market has emerged.41 KKR's second-quarter report showed Arctos had returned just under $380 million to investors across two sports funds with roughly $7 billion in commitments.41

The exits that have happened mostly depended on someone buying the whole team. Blue Owl's Dyal fund sold its 4.9% of the Phoenix Suns in Mat Ishbia's $4 billion purchase, after buying in at a $1.5 billion valuation. Arctos sold part of its Tampa Bay Lightning stake at close to $2 billion, less than two years after paying $1.4 billion.42 One industry tracker notes that almost every realized return so far came from a full-team sale. Whether a minority investor can create its own exit is still largely an open question.47

The industry has responded by making its money more permanent. KKR bought Arctos for $1.4 billion. KKR's long-dated and permanent capital now makes up 53% of its assets, which suits the decades-long holding periods league rules effectively require.24 Thrive Eternal says its strategy is to own a small number of assets for many decades.23 Some managers have moved stakes into continuation funds or evergreen vehicles so they can wait longer for buyers and further price gains.41 Ares launched an evergreen vehicle for its sports strategy.45 Advisers now describe longer holds as a choice rather than a burden, saying investors have become more patient with trophy assets that keep appreciating.42

That is partly making the best of a constraint. Funds sell holding periods of seven to 10 years to their own investors, and there is a clear mismatch between that and assets they may not be able to sell on their own schedule. The newer Harbinger Sports Partners, which is targeting exits in seven to 10 years, is testing whether a traditional fund timeline can work here at all.24

Private credit is quietly doing much of the work

The less visible story is lending. Analysts note that league rules and the small number of teams cap how much equity any firm can put to work. A credit fund, by contrast, can make dozens of loans a year and collect the same interest whether the team wins or loses.5 Apollo estimates most franchises borrow only about 10% of their value. It describes sports as a market of more than $2.5 trillion that could be served by senior loans, media-rights and stadium financing, and preferred equity.4

Europe shows where this goes. Inter Milan placed its broadcast and sponsorship revenue in a separate company and sold investment-grade notes against it. Juventus sold 12-year notes at a fixed 4.15%. Everton took on 30-year stadium financing.7 Lenders are also using hybrid structures that pay steady interest but include warrants or conversion rights, which amount to buying future equity while getting debt-like returns. Analysts say these can help teams work around league borrowing limits.5 The Yankees package, which mixes a $1 billion loan with staged equity, looks like a U.S. version of the same approach.38

Credit brings its own risks. Fitch put the U.S. private credit default rate at 9.2% in 2025, and several large managers limited investor withdrawals from credit funds. Supporters argue that sports loans sit apart from the troubled software and technology lending and have seen few defaults.9 Pricing varies widely, from Juventus's 4.15% to a reported 8.75% on a loan to a lower-ranked Premier League club. One newsletter that covers the market expects at least one high-profile sports credit restructuring in 2026 or 2027.7

The bottom line

Private equity is not buying sports teams the way it buys companies. Firms are buying a share of scarce, appreciating assets with steady media income, and leagues set the terms. They take returns where they can, through valuation gains, structured loans and occasional sales when a team changes hands. The firms best placed to succeed have permanent capital and both equity and lending businesses, which describes KKR, Apollo and Ares. Fans should expect more Yankees-style deals mixing debt and equity, and more leagues loosening their caps. If a minority stake is ever forced onto the market when no one is buying the whole team, that sale will show whether these valuations hold up outside private deals.