Port Workers Strike Hits 113 Ports as Arms Cargo Protest Spreads

A one-day walkout at a much larger scale

On Friday, October 30, dockworkers stopped work at ports across Europe and beyond. They were protesting the use of commercial harbours to move weapons, along with the deaths of seafarers in conflicts from the Gulf to the Black Sea.16 Reporting on the size of the action converges on more than 25 unions at 113 ports in 22 countries. The call first came from port unions in Italy, France, Greece, Spain's Basque Country, Turkey and Morocco.1112 The ports on the list include several of the busiest container hubs serving Europe and South Asia: Hamburg, Valencia, Le Havre, Algeciras, Piraeus, Genoa, Morocco's Tangier Med and India's Nhava Sheva.1216

The action has grown quickly. One account traces three waves. The first, in October 2025, involved about 20 ports in seven countries. The second came on February 6, 2026, again at around 20 ports. Friday's action is the third and largest.13 Organisationally, it grew out of the Istanbul Declaration, adopted in May by unions from more than 35 ports, which called for harbours free of weapons cargo and a second coordinated day of action before the end of the year.1113

The demands go beyond weapons. Strikers also asked for higher pay, better working conditions and doctors on board ships that cross war zones.16 The organising statement also opposes automation and artificial intelligence when they are used to cut dock jobs.11 French unions added objections to the government's budget plans.6 For supply chain managers, that mix matters. A movement built on both pay and politics has more reasons to strike again than a single-issue protest does.

Where cargo actually stopped

The impact was uneven, and it was greatest in France and Greece. France's CGT Ports et Docks forecast a 95 percent cut in operations at French ports. HAROPA Port confirmed that container terminals at Le Havre would be disrupted for a full 24 hours.1315 In Greece, cargo handling at Piraeus was disrupted and ferries to the islands were suspended. About 3,000 dockworkers and seafarers joined the walkout.16 Dockworkers at Piraeus said they would stop work from 0800 to 1100 GMT, while other Greek unions planned a full 24-hour strike.12

Italy was harder to read. The grassroots union USB called a 24-hour general strike, with protests planned in more than 40 cities.12 One report said a nationwide strike covered Genoa, Livorno, Trieste and Civitavecchia, and that Terminal Darsena Toscana had warned customers of uncertain operations.15 Yet a spokesman for Genoa, Italy's busiest port, said he expected only a limited impact.1112 Beyond Europe, organisers said about a dozen Indian ports could be affected.9 In the United States, participation was limited to dockworkers in ILWU Local 10 in San Francisco and Oakland. No national US union signed on.311

Tactics also varied by union. Some held full-day strikes, some stopped for a few hours, and others rallied at the port gates.11 In practice, "113 ports" describes how far the movement reaches more than how much work actually stopped. An Israeli government assessment made the same point ahead of the strike. It expected that many listed ports would see only marches and statements, and that real disruption would be concentrated where workers actually walked out or refused to handle cargo.5

The numbers are soft and they don't match

The headline cost figures come from campaigners and have not been independently confirmed.11 Organisers said the action could affect more than 40 percent of Mediterranean cargo and delay more than $2 billion in freight.12 The campaign group No Harbour for Genocide went further. It said 52,000 containers would be held up, carrying cargo worth $2.8 billion.16 Another estimate put the number of delayed containers at up to 40,000.9 The same group told Al Jazeera that participating Mediterranean ports handle 63 percent of the sea's container activity, and that the striking ports worldwide handle 13.5 percent of global shipping.2 At an October 15 press conference, unions said a single day's delay could cost $43 million in lost profit.3

Coverage also disagrees on basics. Some reports counted 111 ports instead of 113.19 At least one put the number of countries at 17, not 22.15 The gap between 40 percent of Mediterranean cargo and 63 percent of container activity is too wide to explain away. In this analysis's reading, the figures show the network's potential reach if every listed port shut completely, which did not happen.

Why freight markets barely moved

The experts quoted in the coverage expected the effect on global supply chains to be small. Marcus Baker, who leads marine, cargo and logistics at the broker Marsh, said a 24-hour stoppage is unlikely to materially disrupt trade flows. He added that perishable and time-sensitive goods could still be hit.6 Logistics firms issued routine warnings. C.H. Robinson told clients to expect delays at participating ports that would vary by terminal and by local turnout.6 Kuehne+Nagel had already flagged the French action in advisories before the strike.13

The wider freight market explains why a one-day strike struggles to move prices. Mediterranean rates were already volatile for other reasons. The Freightos Baltic Index showed Asia–Mediterranean prices up 8 percent in the week before the strike, to $4,252 per FEU. Asia–North Europe rose 3 percent to $3,551. Carriers are relying on port congestion and cancelled sailings to push through November increases, even though demand is cooling.22 Drewry's composite World Container Index fell 3 percent to $4,429 on October 29, mainly because transpacific rates slid.26 Xeneta data showed Mediterranean spot rates more than a third below their July peak, as carriers kept returning to the Red Sea.28

That return to the Red Sea is the main force in the market. Alphaliner estimates that nearly two-thirds of Asia–Europe capacity now routes through the Red Sea, and the share is 70 percent on Mediterranean services.21 Shorter voyages put more effective capacity into the market, which usually pushes rates down. But ships arriving early can bunch up at terminals that are already clearing backlogs.21 This is where the strike's real cost sits. It probably won't produce a rate spike. It adds one more day of backlog at hubs where schedules are already shaky.

The costs go to shippers, not the rate indexes

Shippers are more likely to see costs as fees and delays than in benchmark rates. Freight forwarders warned of scheduling delays and higher demurrage charges if congestion builds at transshipment hubs such as Tangier Med and Algeciras. They also said carriers may reroute ships or skip ports, which raises costs for European importers.15 Some analysts warned that delays could run into the following week as terminals clear the backlog.13 Baker said the strike adds another layer of strain on top of Middle East tensions, El Niño, restrictions on the Rhine and the Panama Canal, and changing tariffs.6

The strike also came during a wider wave of labour disputes. At Los Angeles–Long Beach, about 250 port watchmen authorised a strike that could start November 1. The terminals that employ them handle about 85 percent of Long Beach's cargo.21 Earlier in October, ver.di members at six German seaports rejected an employer pay offer, and a ballot on indefinite strikes was under way.23 Each dispute is separate. Together, they show organised labour pressing on several major gateways at once.

The bigger risk: ports as a pressure point

The significance of the October 30 action is less about one day's lost volume than the network it showed. Commercial ports have no legal way to refuse arms cargo that a government has licensed. The Arms Trade Treaty puts obligations on exporting states, not on terminal operators or workers. That leaves dockworker refusal as one of the few ways to block a shipment below the level of governments.13 Campaigners say this has worked before. They cite the Saudi vessel Bahri Yanbu, which returned to its origin in 2025 without unloading after a blockade in Genoa.13 They also claim Maersk quietly dropped Fos from weapons routes after local opposition.1

That creates a cost for shippers that is hard to price. Commercial terminals handle civilian and military cargo side by side. A stoppage aimed at weapons therefore delays consumer goods, farm products and industrial parts as well.13 The legal risk also runs both ways. Markos Bekris, leader of the Greek union ENEDEP, faces prosecution over a 2024 blockade of an ammunition container bound for Israel.7 The context points to more of the same. Europe was the world's largest arms-importing region in 2021–2025, and rearmament is increasing military traffic through the same civilian harbours.911

This analysis reads Friday as a minor event for freight markets but a significant one for planning. The movement grew from 20 ports to 113 in eight months. Shippers on Mediterranean lanes should treat coordinated, politically driven stoppages as a recurring risk and plan buffer stock, routing alternatives and demurrage exposure accordingly.